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India had settled maritime boundary issues with all its neighbours including Sri 
Lanka. In reality, however, India still has issues to be addressed in Palk Strait 
with Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean. In spite of the existence of two maritime 
agreements of 1974 and 1976, there are certain irritants between the two 
neighbours. The main issue is the status of Kachchativu, a small barren island in 
the Palk Bay area and the fishing around it. The contest for marine resources in 
and around Kachchativu by Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen has not only 
heighten the disagreement between stakeholders but also led to demands to 
reclaim the island by Indian fishermen and Dravidian political parties in Tamil 
Nadu. The paper examines the historical debates between two countries on the 
legal claim of the barren island, its settlement and its implication on India's 
domestic politics, and the challenges faced at the moment. Particularly, the 
recurring attack on Indian fishermen in Palk Straits by the Sri Lankan Navy 
then and now has become a contentious issue between two neighbours, which 
require comprehensive analysis. Finally, the paper highlights the availability of 
reasonable options before two countries in strengthening of cooperation and 
amicable settlement of fishery row. 
 





India and Sri Lanka enjoy a cordial relationship historically, aided by geographical 
proximity and cultural affinities. In fact, Sri Lanka is barely twenty-two miles from 
India's southern tip, Rameswaram, and separated only by a narrow strip of the ocean, 
the Palk Strait. The presence of a populace who are allegedly migrated from India and 
in particular with the same ethnicity and identifiable culture and tradition across the 
Palk Strait has contributed to this closeness. In spite of this, occasionally there is 
misunderstanding and mistrust between the two neighbours. Although many factors 
contribute to this divergence, maritime issues are one of the primary sources of 





Lanka, including political, navigational, and fisheries issues. Fishing around 
Kachchativu, a small, barren island in the Palk Bay area is the foremost reason for this 
contention. The contest for rich marine resources in and around Kachchativu by Indian 
and Sri Lankan fishermen has heightened the disagreement between the two countries. 
Notably, the increased attack on Indian fisherman by the Sri Lankan Navy in Palk Strait 
in the Indian Ocean in the past decade had strained Indo-Sri Lanka maritime relations to 
the extent that the Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe justifies the Indian 
fishermen getting shot by Sri Lankan navy in 2015. Understandably, the island of 
Kachchativu that is ceded to Sri Lanka in 1974 is culturally and ecologically important 
to the fishermen of Tamil Nadu in India. This has led to demands for the return of the 
island to India or the grant of access rights to engage in fishing around the island in 
Tamil Nadu's political sphere. 
Further, the increasing role of China and Pakistan in Sri Lanka since the late 
2000s has added another dimensional maritime challenge for India in the region. 
Significantly, the awarding of the Hambantota port development project to Beijing by 
Colombo has not only become an area of strategic concern to India's maritime security 
but also contributed to the maritime tension between the two countries. In the same 
manner, the grant of oil exploration blocks to Chinese-owned corporations in 
Talaimannar in Northern Sri Lanka in early 2000s added strategic friction in New 
Delhi–Colombo maritime affairs. Finally, another source of maritime tension between 
India and Sri Lanka is the Sethusamudram Shipping Canal Project undertook by India 
to link Palk Bay with the Gulf of Mannar in the Indian Ocean. Although Sri Lanka is 
taciturn on India's canal project, it loathes the venture owing to an economic loss of 
container traffic at its Colombo and Galle ports apart from environmental concerns. 
This, in fact, provides for one more underlying difference in their maritime relations. 
In this respect, this paper will examine the major issues that impact India-Sri 
Lanka maritime affairs. Also, the paper will seek to find out how these issues are 
manifested in the Palk Strait even after maritime agreements between two neighbours in 
the past. The presence of outside powers in Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean in general 
and the implications of maritime issues in the Palk Strait on the domestic politics of 
India are as well dealt with. Finally, the paper suggests the pragmatic options available 
for India in maritime affairs. 
In this context, the following are prominent ones that, by and large, demand 
consideration. 
 
Kachchativu   
 
India shares maritime boundaries with all of its neighbours in the region. Understanding 
the influence of the surrounding maritime environment on a nation's destiny, India 
made an effort to settle all of its maritime boundary issues with all of its neighbours 
including Sri Lanka. These arrangements have worked well over the years except with 
Sri Lanka, where the cession of Kachchativu Island to Sri Lanka in 1974 tension has 
been festering for the past two decades. The assault on Indian fishermen in the Palk Bay 
close to Kachchativu by Sri Lanka Navy since 2006 has aggravated the situation and 
heightened the call for the return of the island in Tamil Nadu. 




Kachchativu is a tiny, rocky island with an area of 1.15 sq. km, one mile long, 
300 yards broad, and has an area of 285.2 acres (Raju, 2009) in the Palk Strait, about 12 
km from the Indian coast and about 18 km of Sri Lankan Island of Delft. Traditionally, 
the island had been used by fishermen from both India and Sri Lanka. For Indian 
fishermen, the island is part of their ‘traditional fishing grounds' hence they used it as a 
staging post to dry nets and to celebrate St. Anthony's festival at the Catholic Church 
built by Indian fishermen, which is dedicated to Saint Anthony, who is considered to be 
the guardian of fishermen. Tamil Fishermen believe that the saint is protecting them 
from rough sea and inclement weather. The St. Anthony's festival at Kachchativu is 
held every year in April-May. It is also an occasion for informal barter trade between 
two countries fishermen, items like lungis, tea powder, coconut oil and arrack.  
Historically, Kachchativu  Island was claimed to be an integral part of the 
Zamindari of the Raja of Ramnad (Ramanathapuram of Tamil Nadu) who is 
considered ahead of his region and landlord under British Colonial rule, and has 
authority to collect all taxes on his lands and then hand over the collected taxes to the 
British rulers. However, the island was ceded to British ruled Sri Lanka by British 
authorities in India, without establishing or documenting its ownership rights over the 
island. The government of Madras Presidency—later Tamil Nadu—and the government 
of India which became its successor with the lapse of the Zamindari system did not take 
any interest in ascertaining its legality over the island after British rule.  As a result, the 
Kachchativu Island was virtually left with Sri Lanka, and the issue did not get any 
attention until the mid-1960s, even though the Tamil Nadu government maintained its 
claim. 
Incidentally, the issue of Kachchativu first arose in 1921 at the conference 
convened by the British ruling authorities to demarcate fisheries line between India and 
Sri Lanka. This was followed by a series of bilateral discussions, relating to maritime 
boundary demarcation and related matters. However, the issue came up for discussion 
at the highest political level only in November-December 1968, during the visit of Sri 
Lankan Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake to India. India made a proposal that the 
lease of the island in perpetuity can be done either by Sri Lanka to India or by India to 
Sri Lanka. But Sri Lanka rejected this idea as it involved modification or denial of its 
claim of sovereignty over the island. Nevertheless, India reiterated the proposal in 1973 
when then visiting Indian Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh had discussions with W.T. 
Jayasinghe, then Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka, 
in Colombo on 24 December 1973 (Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of External 
Affairs, 2008.) However, notably, for the first time, New Delhi conveyed to Colombo 
that it is willing to offer Kachchativu  Island to Sri Lanka on perpetual lease on nominal 
rent or without rent, even when it has sovereignty over Kachchativu. Sri Lanka again 
turned down this proposal. From then on, Kachchativu became an area of dispute 
between the fishermen of both countries. 
Meanwhile, in 1974, the Indian government under Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi decided to cede the island to Sri Lanka to further bilateral relations and to check 
the increasing influence of the United States (US) in Sri Lanka. New Delhi's decision to 
offer the islet voluntarily to Colombo was based on two factors. First, India was 





the US bid to win the Trincomalee harbour and setting up of the Voice of America in 
the island nation. 
Secondly, although the Indian government did not question the Tamil Nadu's 
claims on the island based on Zamindari of Raja of Ramnad, it was not sure whether the 
Raja of Ramnad had sovereignty. According to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in his 
speech in Rajya Sabha on September 1960 "there was a claim on one of the old 
principal Zamindaris, and it was part of the Zamindari. The Zamindari has gone now, 
and I don't know where the matter stands."  (Raju, 2009). On the other hand, Sri Lanka 
was able to produce sufficient evidence such as Portuguese and Dutch records and 
maps that showed Kachchativ as part of Sri Lanka, as proof of Sri Lanka's sovereignty 
over the island (Vivekananthan, 2008).  Consequently, the India-Sri Lanka maritime 
agreement was signed on June 26, 1974, where India ‘gifted' Kachchativu to Colombo 
presumably as a goodwill measure. Later in March 1976 India and Sri Lanka signed 
another agreement on the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Mannar and the Bay of 
Bengal. The maritime boundary in the Palk Strait was fixed in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the 1958 UN Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone. 
The yielding of a ‘barren' island to Sri Lanka by India was viewed as a move to 
"mend fences" and advance "friendly relations" with its southern neighbour 
(Subramanian, 2003). In fact, then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi approved the ceding 
of the island to Sri Lanka despite strong objection and protest from Tamil Nadu. 
Reportedly, in the view of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the island was a "sheer rock 
with no strategic importance" (Raju, 2009). However, on account of widespread protest 
in Tamil Nadu, the Indian government worked with Sri Lanka by which Colombo 
recognised the "traditional rights" of Indian fishermen to rest, and pilgrimage to 
Kachchativu during the annual festival held at St. Anthony's church. In short, these 
agreements gave up Indian fishermen's fishing rights. 
The escalation of armed civil war in Sri Lanka in 1983 had, however, 
complicated the India-Sri Lanka arrangement on Kachchativu. Particularly, with the 
gradual rise of attacks on Indian fishermen by the Sri Lankan Navy in the vicinity of 
Kachchativu since the beginning of Eelam War IV in 2006 has triggered the call from 
within India—Tamil Nadu—to retrieve the island from Sri Lanka. The protection of 
Indian fishermen and their rights are said to be the primary justification for such 
demands. The subsequent chief ministers of Tamil Nadu had voiced their support in 
favour of the return of Kachchativu to India. For instance, the then Chief Minister of 
Tamil Nadu, Jayalalithaa demanded the Union Government get back the isle on 15 
August 1991 and later in 1993 (Subramanian, 2007). Jayalalithaa even filed a petition 
with the Supreme Court of India years later in 2008, challenging the islet transfer, citing 
procedural violations by New Delhi. The case is still pending before the court. Her 
political opponent, Karunanidhi, the former chief minister and the head of the Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) demanded the Indian government to take back the 
Kachchativu islet from Sri Lanka at the Kancheepuram rally on 26 September 2009 
(Sathiyamoorthy, 2009). 
In response to repeated calls for return of Kachchativu Island from Tamil Nadu, 
Sri Lanka has rejected the call terming the demand impossible to comply with. Sri 
Lanka reasoned that "it is impossible to give it back to them as the international 




community has recognised it as an integral part of our country since it was handed over 
by late Indira Gandhi" (The Hindu, 2001). 
Understandably, given the diplomatic constraints and issues of legality, the 
majority of the advocates—fishermen, civil society and political parties—who seek 
Indian control over Kachchativu  have suggested that at least India should lease the 
island in perpetuity, "thereby skirting sovereignty issues while still addressing 
pragmatic security considerations" (Orland, 2007). For this, they propose that India 
may offer Sri Lanka either territorial or economic incentives. Even though these options 
seem feasible and a way to resolve the issue, both India and Sri Lanka are not interested 
in pursuing the issue given the resentment of the majority of Sri Lankans and India's 




Fishing in and around Kachchativu was not problematic for the Indian fishermen till the 
early 1980s, despite the ceding of the island to Sri Lanka. But with the rise of Tamil 
militancy in Sri Lanka—Jaffna peninsula—in 1983, Tamil Nadu fishermen began 
confronting difficulties in fishing in the Palk Strait. Notably, the Sri Lankan Tamil 
rebels' activities—to smuggle arms, ammunition, fuel and medicines—in the Palk 
Strait, and later the increased profile of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Sea 
Tiger unit, forced Sri Lanka to place unofficial restrictions on the movement of Indian 
fishermen close to Kachchativu. 
But the abundance of rich marine resources such as shrimp, lobster, and crabs 
in the waters close to Mannar and Kachchativu attracts Indian fishermen from Tamil 
Nadu, particularly from the coastal districts of Rameswaram, Pudukottai and 
Nagapattinam to deep-water fishing in the Palk Strait. Actually, both the Indian and Sri 
Lankan fishermen cross over the waters because of the better catch in quantity and 
quality of fish such as tuna. In the process, reportedly Indian fishermen inadvertently 
enter Sri Lankan territorial waters surrounding the Kachchativu, making both the entry 
and the subsequent fishing activities illegal. Even though the 1974 and 1976 India-Sri 
Lanka maritime agreements provide Indian fishermen with an opportunity for resting 
and to dry their nets on the Kachchativu island, the reported ‘unlawful fishing in their 
waters' triggers an ‘inhumane response' from the Sri Lankan Navy from time to time.  
Since 1983 till the mid-2000s, the Sri Lanka Navy's attacks have resulted in the death 
of 132 fishermen, the destruction of about 300 boats and the detention of about 90 
fishermen apart from hundreds which are missing (Subramanian, 2007). This has 
heightened the maritime tension between India and Sri Lanka.  
The shooting of Tamil Nadu fishermen instigated the political parties and 
fishermen community to protest against the Sri Lankan action and on several occasions 
to demand the Indian government's strong response. For instance, the then Chief 
Minister of Tamil Nadu, Karunanidhi, in a letter to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on 
22 September 2006, protested the "inhuman act of the Sri Lankan Navy" who 
intercepted apparently four Tamil Nadu fishermen of Sirvathur of Nagapattinam fishing 
in the Palk Strait within Indian territorial waters and manhandled them  (Government of 
Tamil Nadu, 2006). Reportedly, two of these fishermen were feared to have drowned as 





Karunanidhi issued a stern warning that if the Sri Lanka Navy opened fire on Tamil 
fishermen again "the hands of the Tamil fishermen will not be merely fishing in the 
sea." Subsequently, on March 9, 2007, due to the repeated Sri Lankan Navy firing on 
Indian fishermen, the DMK government acted decisively and swiftly to register its 
protest with the Union Government. It held a demonstration to "warn" the Sri Lankan 
government against encouraging it's Navy's atrocities aside from submitting a 
memorandum to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, seeking his intervention "to stop the 
Sri Lankan Navy's attacks on innocent, unarmed Tamil Nadu fishermen."  
After the repeated incident of assaults on fishermen and the protests in Tamil 
Nadu, the Coast Guard and the Coastal Security Group of Tamil Nadu had taken certain 
initiatives to address the problem. First, they visited the "problematic areas" on the 
International Maritime Boundary Line between India and Sri Lanka in the Palk Strait 
and on the shore for a survey. At last, they met leaders of several fishermen's 
associations and reportedly advised them to keep off the Sri Lankan waters to avoid any 
untoward incidents. However, leaders of the Tamil Nadu Fishermen's Associations 
rejected this suggestion.  
But the Sri Lankan Navy maintains that they generally let off the poaching 
Indian fishermen in Sri Lankan waters on humanitarian reasons (Asian Tribute, 2008). 
Unless they have been involved in any nefarious activities in support of the LTTE such 
as smuggling contraband across the Palk Strait to the northern coast of Sri Lanka. The 
clash of Sri Lankan Navy with Sea Tigers in the north and eastern Sri Lankan coasts 
apparently had an impact on the Indian fishermen assaults. Equally, the LTTE also 
reportedly assaulted the Indian fishermen in the Palk Strait in an effort to imprison 
Indian boats which they may use later for the ferry their own men and stir anti–Sri 
Lankan sentiments in India (Gupta & Sharma, 2004). Sri Lanka believes that the 
straying of Indian fishermen into their waters were the foremost reasons for the 
problem. Colombo has suggested joint patrol of the area by the Indian and Sri Lankan 
Navies, but New Delhi does not look inclined to this idea (Subramanian, 2007). 
On the allegations of Indian fishermen ‘straying' into Sri Lankan waters 
habitually, the former points out the very nature of fishing in Palk Strait "drags" their 
boats to the Sri Lankan waters inadvertently. For instance, T. Anthonyraj, president of 
the Vercode Mechanised Trawlers' Fishermen's Association in Rameswaram, 
maintained that the straying of boats as ‘natural.' In his words,  
 
A stretch of 3 km east of Rameswaram coast is reserved for fishing by country boats 
and catamarans. Boats and catamarans do not need authorisation (tokens) from the 
Fisheries Department because they cannot go far out into the sea. The next 6 km, a 
stretch that falls on the Indian side, has "nothing but rocks and so we have to cross 
them to spread our nets"... After dropping their nets, the fishermen usually wait for 
about four hours for a good catch. During this time, the mechanised trawlers and the 
country boats fitted with engines start drifting at the rate of 3 km an hour due to 
ocean currents. So the boats drift about 21 km from the Indian shores, 9 m beyond 
Kachchativu  (Subramanian, 2007). 
 
In addition, Indian fishermen testify that the Sri Lanka Navy's attacks on them in Palk 
Bay were "unwarranted" because they have proper identification cards that were issued 




by the provincial Tamil Nadu government to fishermen. Also, they contend that they 
adhere to a series of procedures which were put in place by the Indian government 
before venturing into the sea. For instance, before any fishing crew sails out, the head 
of the crew provides a list of the fishermen names of its team to the office of the 
Assistant Director of Fisheries. The fisheries department too issued a token to the 
trawler for buying a limited diesel to operate the trawler. 
Similarly, it seems they also inform the Indian Navy before they sail out and 
also show their identity cards, authorisation letter and amount of diesel they carry to the 
stationed Indian Navy/Coast Guard vessels. They also argue that sometimes, the Sri 
Lanka Navy also verify their identity cards. Hence, Indian fishermen are of the view 
that if the Sri Lankan Navy fires on them after all these, "what is the sanctity of this 
arrangement?" when they follow these procedures before going into the sea. And even 
if they replace a single member of the crew, it seems they inform the Fisheries 
Department. 
For the fishermen, maritime boundaries are manmade creations, as throughout 
the centuries they have been fishing in their neighbourhood waters, where there is 
plenty of fish (Suryanarayan & Swaminathan, 2009). They feel the conclusion of the 
maritime boundary agreements have ignored the realities of fishermen livelihood, as 
following the 1974 accord only, they believe that assaults on fishermen—killing, 
detention, intimidation and harassments—have increased. In their view, good 
neighbourly relations are essential for countries, but fishermen should not be expected 
to pay for them with their traditional livelihood.  
In the last two decades, various proposals have been made from time to time 
from the Indian side, including a proposal for lease in perpetuity or reciprocal licensing 
but nothing has been agreed upon by two sides. The groups who are vociferous in their 
support of the fishermen suggest that the Indian government take a proactive role in 
finding a solution to the problem by making an agreement with Colombo so that 
licensed Indian fishermen could be permitted to fish in Sri Lankan waters in specified 
areas (Suryanarayan, 1994). This will help prevent the termed "unlawful activities" in 
the Palk Strait.  Indeed, in 2003, Sri Lanka also called for detailed proposals in this 
respect for its considered examination. Unfortunately, the Government of India did not 
follow up on the matter; still, more unfortunate incidents happened. The Government of 
Tamil Nadu also did not pursue it vigorously enough with the Indian government. This 
matter, therefore, requires the concerted action of India. Otherwise, the issues of fishing 
in Palk Bay will continue to add tensions in the maritime relations of India and Sri 
Lanka until a workable solution such as leasing of Kachchativu by India or 




The geo-strategic importance of the Indian Ocean has always been of interest to the 
region's and the world's major powers. All have an interest in the Indian Ocean 
obviously for political, security, economic, and maritime resource reasons. Notably, the 
rich resources like fisheries, offshore oil and gas, and undersea minerals together with 
geographical and historical convergence of west and east by trade and diplomatic 





other regional powers to interact with the South Asian region in the Indian Ocean. As a 
result, any major development in the Indian Oceans has repercussions in the adjoining 
countries or the region as a whole. Maritime issues in the Indian Ocean, in particular in 
the South Asian region are linked to the littoral states—Bangladesh, India, the 
Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.  
In this context, the geo-strategic location of Sri Lanka entices the interest of 
global and regional powers. Many have taken an interest in the island nation owing to 
the fact that it straddles the Indian Ocean and the Sea Lines of Communication— the 
main channel of sea navigation from east to west. There is a long history of external 
powers' involvement in Sri Lanka. During the Cold War, both superpowers—the US 
and the Soviet Union—tried to reinforce their maritime influence directly or indirectly 
through an impressive array of available port facilities in this region (Rais, 1987; 
Wingerter, 1977). Particularly, Trincomalee harbour in north-eastern Sri Lanka has 
attracted the attention of the major powers because it is considered strategically 
important as it controls access to the northern Indian Ocean. In contemporary times, the 
key players include the US, the United Kingdom (UK), and Russia, while China is 
strengthening its base. Interestingly, the US interest in the Indian Ocean region 
increased even after the end of the Cold War, and the US believes its presence is 
crucial, given the volatile nature of the region.  
However, what is important for analysis is the rise of Chinese influence in the 
Indian Ocean, particularly in Sri Lanka. Aware of the importance of the Indian Ocean, 
particularly South Asia, China has made efforts to establish its presence in the region, 
initially through links with Pakistan and, more recently, with Sri Lanka. China's efforts 
to gain a foothold in the Indian Ocean are an attempt to assert itself as a key player as 
well for it's economic, navigational, security, and strategic requirements. China's links 
to Sri Lanka are primarily related to defence cooperation, whilst trade and commercial 
activities also play an important role part of the grand strategy One Belt One Road 
project. 
On the other hand, Sri Lanka too needed much support for modernised military 
hardware during the concluded Eelam War IV and economic aid for post-war 
development, which was capitalised by China. Notably, China’s investments in road 
and port infrastructure and development projects are in Sri Lanka are significant. For 
instance, China through Hong Kong-based conglomerate Huichen Investment Holdings 
Ltd. investing $28 million to develop Special Economic Zone (SEZ) located in 
Mirigama, near Colombo port, Hambantota Port Development Project (worth US$1 
billion); Norochcholai Coal Power Plant Project (worth US$855 million), Colombo-
Katunayake Expressway (worth US$248.2 million). These investments are indicative of 
the economic assistance being provided to Sri Lanka by China on lucrative soft loans or 
through foreign aid. Whereas, India’s reservation on Colombo’s militaristic approaches 
as well as the West’s concern on human rights violation prevented them from catering 
to Sri Lanka’s needs.  
While there are many areas of investments from the Chinese, two strategic 
investments hold a particular impact on India-Sri Lanka maritime affairs. The first is 
Hambanthota port and the second one is the Chinese oil exploration in the Mannar 
Basin. The Hambanthota port was built at the cost of about US $437, thrice the size of 
Colombo port with the aim of providing the economic impetus to the southern part of 




Sri Lanka (De Silva-Ranasinghe, 2009). But the emerging trends indicate that China 
may definitely look forward to being provided with turn round facilities of these 
projects for the People Liberation Army (PLA) Navy units, if and when needed in 
future that would be routinely deployed in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) (Pant, 2010) 
as it is natural for the PLA ships to call on Hambanthota while on passage to and from 
the Gulf of Aden and would be crucial for supporting the Chinese IOR missions both in 
peace and during times of hostility. But this has raised the alarm within the Indian 
security establishment.  
Finally, Sri Lanka has always been keen to invest in offshore drilling and 
exploration in the Mannar basin where there was an indirect major power rivalry in 
gaining control of the oil resources in the Indian Ocean. Both India and China were also 
interested in offshore exploration in the Mannar Basin. Sri Lanka is trying to balance 
Chinese and Indian interests in the region by offering two blocks each to New Delhi 
and Beijing out of the five blocks that were identified in the early 2000s. More 
importantly, the offer of a block to develop without any bidding to China shows the 
special status that Beijing enjoys in the critical energy sector in the Sri Lankan maritime 
border. Consequently, Cairn India Limited and the Government of Sri Lanka, through 
the Minister of Petroleum and Petroleum Resources Development on 7 July 2008 
signed a Petroleum Resources Agreement with the former. 
Equally, Pakistan's inroad into Sri Lanka with the reported clandestine aim of 
countering India from the south is strategically sensitive to India's interests. More 
importantly, what is more, worrisome for India is the emergence of Pakistan as China's 
force-multiplier against it. Sri Lanka also benefits from the great powers' competition 
for space and maritime influence in the Indian Ocean region not just from China and 
India, but also from others such as Japan and Iran which engage in both economic and 
strategic partnerships of varying dimensions. While there are no doubts that it benefited 
the island nation—in ports, airports, transport sector— eventually it gave rise to subtle 




The issue of Tamil refugee influx from Sri Lanka to India via the Palk Strait and its 
influence on India-Sri Lanka maritime relations can never be ignored. There has been a 
long history of people moving across the Palk Strait from India to Sri Lanka or from Sri 
Lanka to India, particularly to and from northern Sri Lanka. However, with the armed 
conflict in Sri Lanka since 1983, the movement of people has become more 
complicated than migrations in the past. With ethnic tensions leading to ruthless 
conflict in Sri Lanka in the early 1980s, the Palk Strait became the access route between 
India and Sri Lanka for conflict-affected people to find a safe haven. Both rebels and 
affected civilians of northern and eastern Sri Lanka used the sea route between Jaffna in 
Sri Lanka to Vedaranyam in India and Talaimannar in Sri Lanka to Rameswaram in 
India. 
As a result of this close geographical proximity of Sri Lanka's northern coast to 
the shores of Tamil Nadu, an influx of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees into South India has 
increased many folds. This however caused a strain in Indo–Sri Lanka relations for 





invited the attention of India and in fact resulted in India's intervention in Sri Lanka's 
ethnic conflict. The Tamil refugee influx was the most critical factor that had an impact 
on the domestic politics of Tamil Nadu and subsequently gave rise to the pro-Sri 




The connection between the environment projects and maritime issues between 
neighbours is evident from India's Sethusamudram project in the Indian Ocean. Given 
the extreme narrowness in the Palk Strait between India and Sri Lanka, India was on a 
disadvantage of enjoying a continuous navigable sea route in its territorial waters from 
its western to eastern coasts. Indian ships were required to circumnavigate Sri Lanka. 
Therefore, to address this problem, the Government of India conceived the 
Sethusamudran Ship Canal Project (SSCP) on 2 July 2005, in order to dredge the Palk 
Strait and facilitate direct transportation. The Sethusamudram Corporation Limited was 
tasked with dredging the channel, and the Tuticorin Port Trust (TPT) was assigned as 
the nodal agency for executing the project. The project cost is estimated at the US $550. 
The aimed SSCP will not only substantially reduce the distance between ports in India 
but also saves on the amount of fuel consumed by ships and standing charges associated 
with longer voyages. For instance, the distance between Tuticorin and Chennai will 
drop from 769 to 335 nautical miles, and between Tuticorin to Kolkata in the eastern 
coast will be reduced from 1,371 to 1,031 nautical miles. The SSCP also aims to 
develop the Tuticorin port, which may promote the economic development of the 
southern districts of Ramanathpuram and Tirunelveli in Tamil Nadu. 
Although the Sri Lankan government has been silent on the project apparently 
after an initial diplomatic objection, there has been yet a considerable opposition from a 
section of civil society and political parties in Sri Lanka to this project. In particular, the 
Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), a political party of Buddhist monks, was against the 
project (Sambandan, 2005). They are probably concerned about the environmental 
impact it has on northern Sri Lanka and the loss of standing charges that Colombo port 
will suffer. Sri Lankan concerns include the impact on the marine ecosystem and on 
water quality; the implications of dredging and dumping over 80 million cubic meters 
of ocean floor material; the possibility of blasting, resulting in the destruction of marine 
life and disturbance of the marine ecology; damage to the coral reef; and depletion of 
fish stocks and ensuing loss of local livelihoods. To an extent, the formation of an 
expert committee by both India and Sri Lanka had pacified the latter, and even the 




Another important adjunct to maritime issues in the Indian Ocean is drug and arms 
trafficking. The nexus of these two phenomena is reportedly deeply linked with terror 
groups in the region. Drug and arms trafficking is by far the most lucrative means of 
generating funds to fuel the terror activities and insurgencies movement today. The 
well-organized LTTE of northern Sri Lanka till late 2000s is a case in point. 
Considering the geopolitical setup of the IOR, the LTTE used the waters of the Indian 




Ocean, particularly the Palk Strait for its illegal activities (Jane's Intelligence Review, 
2007). The rebels' clandestine logistical infrastructure indeed helped to move people, 
arms and material according to their desires. These unlawful activities of the Tigers had 
major security implications for both India and Sri Lanka. Besides, the emergence of 
Tamil Nadu as a transit point for various drugs and arms smuggling triggered maritime 
contention between India and Sri Lanka. 
Notably, the LTTE who fought for a separate state in Sri Lanka till 2009 is 
known for its involvement in the procurement of weapons in Cambodia and transports 
them by ship to LTTE-controlled areas in northern Sri Lanka. They also engaged in 
dubious maritime trade—drug trafficking and piracy—through their ‘phantom fleet’ 
mostly registered under Flag of Convenience (FOC) countries known as "pan-ho-lib," 
i.e. Panama, Honduras and Liberia. It was difficult to track them as they routinely 
change names and registry. Lloyds of London lists 11 merchant ships belonging to 
Asian front companies that are in reality managed by Kumaran Pathmanathan of the 
then LTTE. Their activities posed a significant challenge to maritime security in the 
Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal in the Indian Ocean till the late 2000s. What is of 
more concern for Indian establishments that time was the Tamil rebels reported supply 
of illegal goods to other terror groups in India such as the Naxalites (Sri Lanka 
Guardian, 2008). On the other hand, Sri Lanka was concerned about the clandestine 
political and social patronage that the LTTE and its supporters enjoyed in Tamil Nadu. 
Notably, the illicit activities of the Tigers seeking entry to or through Sri Lanka via 
Kachchativu/Rameswaaram became a source of irritation for India and Sri Lanka in 
1990s and 2000s. 
 
Major Implications and Options 
 
Are the maritime issues in the Indian Ocean, especially in the Palk Straits capable of 
raising the anti-India spectre to higher proportions? The answer to this is, by and large 
is yes as the trivial skirmish in the Indian Ocean always has the capacity to develop into 
more vigorous anti-India-activities than what it does at present with the growing 
presence of Chinese and other powers. The prospects of China using Sri Lanka for anti-
India activity appears farfetched at present, but its presence in the maritime sphere of 
Sri Lanka is a strategic concern for India in the Indian Ocean. Especially, ever since the 
‘OBOR' concept of China gained prominence, there have been some concerns among 
Indian security establishments about Chinese assistance in the development of the 
Hambantota port on the Indian Ocean in Sri Lanka. Hambantota is said to be on the 
lines of the Gwadar project in Pakistan, a vital maritime link for Beijing in IOR. There 
is a perception that it may be detrimental to India's strategic and security interests, 
owing to its possible future utility as a strategic asset for China. It is believed that the 
reported presence of more than 2500 Chinese workers and large-scale Chinese 
equipment in Sri Lanka are the cause of concern. Also, through Hambantota, China has 
consolidated its position in the Indian Ocean, close to the Indian shore, perhaps where 
hypothetically it can monitor Indian naval activities in the Arabian Sea. 
Equally, given the positive image that Sri Lanka has vis-à-vis other regional 
powers such as China and Pakistan, its ability to act directly against India is not ruled 





as a conduit for others without bothering India's security and strategic concerns, in the 
long run, is not ruled out. 
The next most important maritime issue that has implications on India-Sri 
Lanka affairs is the rising assaults on Indian fishermen. Apart from affecting India’s 
domestic politics and economy in Tamil Nadu, this issue impacts the bilateral relations 
of these two neighbours. Nearly every bilateral issue between India and Sri Lanka is 
intertwined with some domestic factor, and therefore it impacts both domestic and 
bilateral relations. 
So, the big question is: What are the available options to address these thorny 
issues? First, India needs to enhance its friendship with Sri Lanka through more 
investment and bilateral engagement. As India has acquired the reputation of being a 
‘hegemon' from the perspective of majority Sinhalese, any move to retrieve the islet 
will destabilise the present relations and push Sri Lanka to the side of powers like 
China. Therefore, India may negotiate with Colombo in either taking the islet on a lease 
or bringing the licensed fishing system in the Palk Strait into force. The details of this 
licensed fishing system such as the number of licenses to be issued, the type of fishing 
crafts to be operated, the number of days that fishing can be permitted and the license 
fee to be paid to Sri Lanka may be worked out through mutual consultations. If the 
situation has to move from confrontation to co-operation, it has to be based on equitable 
sharing of marine resources and participatory arrangements. 
Significantly, this doable option will help to avert the possible breakdown of 
India-Sri Lanka bilateral relations as well the rise of anti-India feeling among the Sri 
Lankan political elites. Domestically, the counselling of Indian fishermen about the 
legality of fishing in Sri Lankan waters may be continued. In short, the dormant 
approach of India on the fishermen issue would not help to elevate its fishermen interest 
as well could not be sustained politically in today’s coalition government in India. 
Second, strategically, it is in India's interest to keep its rivals out of its sphere of 
influence. Thus, India needs to be befriending Sri Lanka by making generous 
concessions, especially in the area's trade and development. Arguably, political 
compulsions and calculations have underlined the lack of Indian initiatives in Sri 
Lanka, which created space for external powers such as China. Hence, it is essential to 
recognise that India needs to give a second thought before rejecting any offer from Sri 
Lanka like the Hambanthota project. Such an approach may contribute to a slight 
improvement in the positive political climate and hopefully enable Sri Lanka to address 
India's security concerns. Finally, it is wise for India to engage China in the mutually 
interested areas vigorously by which India can turn away any concealed design of 




While maritime tensions such as assaults on Indian fishermen between India and Sri 
Lanka in the Indian Ocean are significantly kept low profile due to their geopolitical 
implications, India would need to engage Sri Lanka in a constructive manner to retain 
its strategic advantage and to avert the present minor issues turning into a perilous crisis 
in the future. The existing bilateral relations and mechanisms are sufficient enough to 
address the maritime issues such as the assault of fishermen in the Palk Strait. The 




increasingly complex transnational nature of maritime challenges in the 21st century in 
the Indian Ocean with the involvement of external powers requires new policy 
approaches to address challenges that have a multifaceted nature. This is why India 
needs to focus on the maritime skirmish in the Palk Strait in order to ensure that its 
areas of influence in the Indian Ocean are free from external interference and power 
projection. If not, this may perhaps form a major strategic challenge for India in the 
future. The key to pursuing India's global strategic ambition to an extent lies in 
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